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As rve  glance  around, \\'e make a series  of
rapid saccades  that present a new scene  to
the retina  every  300  msec  or so.  Nerv scenes
-for  example,  pictures-are  remarkably
easy  to remember  when seen  for  1 sec or
more  (e.g., Standing, I973),  but  if  pre-
sented  in a rapid sequence  for only 300  msec
each,  about half the scenes  are not remem-
bered  ( Potter  &  Levy,  1969)  .  The  ques-
tion addressed  here  is whether  such  oictures
are momentarily  understood  and then for-
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Three  converging  procedures were  used to  determine  whether  pictures  pre-
sented in a rapid sequence  at rates comparable to eye fixations are understood
and then quickly  forgotten.  In  two  experiments, sequences  of  16 color  photo-
graplrs  were  presented at  rates  of  113, 167, 230, or  333 msec per  picture.
In  one group,  subjects were  given  an immediate  test of  recognition  memory
for  the pictures and in  other groups they searched for  a target  picture. Even
rvhen the target  had only  been specified by a title  (e.g., a  boat)  detection of
a  target  was  strikingly  superior  to  recognition  memory.  Detection  rvas
slightly  but  significantly  better  for  pictured  than  named targets.  In  a  third
experiment  pictures were presented for  50, 70, 90, or  120 msec preceded and
followed  by  a  visual  mask;  at  120 msec  recognition  memory  was  as  ac-
curate as detection had been. The  results, taken together  with  those in  1969
of  Potter  and Levy  for  slolver rates of  sequential presentation, suggest that
on  the  average a  scene is  understood  and  so becomes immune  to  ordinary
visual masking  rvithin  about 100 msec but requires about 300 msec of furthei
processing before the memory  representation is resistant to conceptual mask-
ing  from  a following  picture.  Possible functions  of  a short-term'conceotual
memory, such as the control  of eye fixations, are discussed
gotten or  are simply not  identified in  the
first place.  A verbal itern may be recognized,
held briefly in sl.rort-term  memory, and then
forgotter.r.  The experiments  reported in this
article indicate  that there is a comparable
but  briefer  shor,t-term conceDtual  memorv
for  a  scene,  an interval aftei  identification
rvhen  the memory trace is highly vulnerable
to interference.
One way to detern.rine  whether a picture
in a sequence  is nomentarily understood  and
then forgotten is to  contrast ,the usual de-
layed test  of  recognition memory  with  a
procedure  in which the subject  responds  at
the time of viewing. In  an earlier experi-
ment (Potter, 1975) subjects  searched  for
a target picture in a sequence  and responded
as soon  as they saw it. Some  subjects  were
shown the target picture  itself in  advance
and others were given only a brief title for
the  picture  (..g.,  ,  baby reachi.ng  f  or  a
509510 IyIARY C. POTTER
butterfly). Xlore than 70/o  of the targets
were detected  at a rate of presentation  as
high as 125 nrsec  per pictrlre,  and the two
target grorrps  were not sigllificantly different
irr accuracl'.  Bccarrse  srrbjects  gilen only a
title presrrrrral,ll  lrad  to irlenti[y  the larget
pictrlre before they could compare  it  rvith
the title, I  concluded  that on tl-re  average  a
pictrrre  is identified  in less than 725  msec.l
\\rhen  srrbjects  vien  ed  the  pictures  at  that  rate
rvithout  searching  for a target,  less  than 13/o
\\'ere  recognized  a ferv  mir]utes  later (Potter
ct  Ler'1', 1969)  .  It  appeared that  pictures
are quiclilv iclentifierl  and ther.r  usrlally for-
gottell llnless a  further  interval  of  con-
solidation,  {ree of ilrterruption,  is available.
The prrrpose  of tlie first experiment  rvas
to  replicate  and exteud the earlier study,
using  a largcr nunrber  of target  pictures  and
a  larger group of  subjects.  The  principal
firrrlirrg,  llrat orre  can detect  a picture by
nanre  at rates of presentation  too high to
lenre  arrv  lrelnor.v  for most  of tlre  pictures,
u'as exirectecl  to  be confirmed. A  seconcl
_fincling,  that  groups $'ith  named and pic-
tured targets \\iere ec1ually  accurate,  seemed
n'rore questionable. Itr  searcl-r  experiments
lsing  rvord lists such as those of  Neisser
rlrcl Beller (1965) subjects  are slor,ver  and
less  accurate  wl'rer.r  they or.rly  knorv the cate-
gorv  of  the target l,"orc1s  (e.g., animals)
than n hen tl'rey  knon' the target \\,ord itself
(e.g., uor<se).  In  experiments  reported  by
Pacliella ( 197  5\  viervers had  to  decide
l'hetl.rer  a  single  briefly  exposed picture
n.ratcl'recl  a target.  Showing  the target  picture
itself in  adr,ance  helped much more thatr
simplv r.rarning  tl-re  picturecl  object. Paivio
arrd Begg (19i1)  forrncl  that search  of  a
simultaneor-rs  arra). of  pictures was faster
u'lrerr  the tarqcf nictrrre  was shown  in ad-
l'ance,  rather than named.
On the other hand, in some  search  tasks
it  cloes  not  seem to  r.natter  n'hether one
knou  s tlre  eract appearxnce  of a target  or
onl1.  its category  (e.g.,  Graboi, 1971; Neis-
ser, 1963; Sperling, Budiansky,  &  Spivak,
l97l).  In  tl-rose  experiments  the set of pos-
sible targets was either highly familiar or
became so  through  long  practice. In  the
present procedrrre,  however, the  category
of nerv  pictures  that might fit the title a boat
(for  example) is extremely large and diffi-
cult  to  characterize  in  advance.  For  that
reason  it rvas  expected  that in Experiment  1,
'"vith  a larger nurnber of subjects  and set of
targets  than u'ere  used  in the earlier study
(Potter,  1975), a difference  betrveerr  nanled
and pictured  targets  might be founcl.
ExprnrunNr  1
Irr Experiment  1, one  group of srrbjects
lielved  rapid  picture seqrlences  and  u'as
tested  for recognition  lxemory  and  tu'o other
groups searchcd  for named  or pictured  tar-
gets. Unlike the earlier search  experinrent
(Polter, 19755  in rvhich  targels  appearerl  in
onl,v  3  serial positions  out of  16 and the
nrethod  of measuring  response  time  (RT)
\\'as crurle, in  tlre present searclr  task
targets  appeared  equall,v  often in all serial
positions,  there rn'ere  tlvice as many  se-
quences  per subject,  and  the  measurement  of
RT  was  in.rproved.  Some attention was
given  to metl'rocls  for discriminating  betrveen
false alarr.ns  and correct cletections,  a gen-
eral problem  u,hen  stimuli are presented  in
a continuous  sequence.
XI  etlrod,
Sub  jects.  The  subjects  rvere 96 men and women
college students rvho ucre  paid lor  their  participa-
tion.  Thirty-tri'o  subjects  rvere  assigned  to  each
of  three groups:  picture-target, name-target, and
recognition  groups.
Materials.  The  pictures  were  272  color  photo-
graphs  of  ordinary  scenes  and objects obtained by
Potter  and Levy  (1969) {rom  magazines-a  mix-
ture  of  the  distractors  and  the  stimulus  pictures
used in  that  study.  Secluences  of  16 pictures  were
photographed, trvo frames  to  a picture,  on  16-mm
Kodachrome  cine  film.  The  same  random  order
of  pictures u,as used in  all  conditions. Color  slides
of  thc  pictures  *,ere  used for  the  picture  targets
1  Identification  does  not  imply  covert  naming,
since a  picture  is  understood  conceptually  before
it is narned (Potter  &  Faulconer, 1975). Although
identification  of  different  aspects of a complex  pic-
ture  undoubtedly  can  continue  almost  indefinitely,
at  some point  early  in  processing the  main  theme
or  sorne critical  part  of  the 
'picture  is  correctly
detern.rined.  That  point  is  what  is  meant  here  by
"identification."  Detecting  a picture  on the basis of
a thematic  title  clearly  requires at  least that  level
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and  the  recognition  test.  Written  titles  in  slide
form  r,vere  used for  the name targets.
Apfaratus.  The  picture  sequences \vere  pre-
sented using  an  L-W  variable-speed  16-mm pro-
jector.  For  the  t\.o  search groups,  the  projector
rvas equipped with  a  grooved  wheel  that  tracked
the  outer  edge  of  the  film  above  the  projection
aperture  to  start  a  clock  when  a  special nick  in
the  film  passed the  wheel.  The  subject  responded
to  a  target  by  pressing  a  telegraph  key  that
stopped  the  clock.  The  projected  pictures  were
about  12'  wide  and  8'  high,  on  a  screen 3 m  in
front  of  the  subject.
Design  and  procedure.  In  all  three  groups,  the
rate  of  presentation was a within-subject  variable.
Four  rates were used:  113, 167,  250, and 333 msec.
A  practice  sequence "r.as presented  at  250  msec.
A  given  subject  saw  an  equal number  of  the  re-
maining  16 sequences  at  each rate,  and  the  order
of  rates  rvas permuted  across  subjects  so  that  a
given  sequence was  sholvn  equally  often  at  each
rate.
The  design  and  procedure  in  the  picture-  and
name-target  groups  were  the  same except  that  in
the former  group  subjects u'ere shown an advance
picture  as a target  and in  the latter  group  subjects
r.vere shorvn only  a  descriptive  title  of  the  same
picture  (e.g.,  a  road  zuith  cars,  a  girl  sitting  in
bcd).  The  title  was  a  brief  description of  the
main  event  or  objects  in  the  scene, sufhcient  to
distinguish  the  target  from  other  pictures  in  the
same  sequence. Colors  and  shapes  were  never
specified directly.  The  target  picture  or  name
nas  in  vierv for  5 sec and  lvas turned  off  several
seconds before  the  sequence began.  The  subject
was  instructed  to  press the  response key  as  soon
as  he  sarv  the  target;  RT  r,vas measured  from
the  onset  of  the  target.  Targets  were  selected
equally  often  from  each  serial  position,  counter-
balanced across rates and subjects;  altogether,  128
different  pictures r.vere  used as targets, each shown
to  eight  subjects,  one  subject  in  eacl-r group  at
each rate.
In  the  recognition  group,  the  subject  did  not
look for  a target but simply  viewed eight  sequences
and was tested after  each for  recognition.  The  pic-
tures  from  the  eight  sequences  not  shorvn to  that
subject  were  used as distractors,  so that  each test
consisted of  16 old  pictures mixed  randomly  with
16  ner,v pictures.  The  subject  was  instructed  to
say tc.e if  he r,vas  sure  the  picture  had  been pre-
sented in  the sequence,  maybe if  he thought  so but
was  not  sure,  and  zo  otherwise.  The  sequences
and  distractors  were  interchanged  for  half  the
subjects. The  recognition  procedure  was  like  that
of  Potter  and  Levy's  Experiment  I  (Group  A)
except  that  the  recognition  pictures  lr,'ere slides
and  the  subject wrote  his  response.
Re  sults
Target sedrck. The proportion of correct
detections  in the  two search  groups  is shown
167 250
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Frcunr 1. Experiment  1  : Proportion  of targets
detected  and  pictures  recognized  at different  rates
of presentation.
in Figure 1. The overall  proportion  correct
was .87 for picture targets and 16  for name
targets.  Comparing  the number  of errors of
matched  pairs  of subjects  in the two groups,
the difference  between the groups was sig-
nificant  at each  rate except  113  msec (sign
test, p < .01). For  each group separately,
the differences  among the three higl'rer  rates
'vvere  each significant (sign  test, p <  .02),
but the 333-msec  rate was not significantly
different  lrom 167  or 250 msec.  (The non-
significant  drop in performance  at 333  msec
was attributable to an increase  in  anticipa-
tion  errors  to  pretarget  pictures-false
alarms-wllen there  was  more  time available
for making  a false  response.)
Tl-re  distribution of  errors is  sholvn in
Table 1.  A response  was  considered  an error
of anticipation  if it occurred  before  the tar-
get picture or within 250 msec afterrvard.
(About half the anticipations  were reported
at the  time by the subject.)  RTs longer  than
900 msec  (1/"  of the trials) and failures  to
respond were  counted as  misses., X{ost
z Although  the  criterion  for  a  correct  detection
was  relatively  stringent,  neither  the  pattern  of  re-
sults  nor  the  estimated  identification  thresholds
would  have  been  altered  substantially  if  all  re-
sponses  after  onset of  the target  had been counted
as detections.
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DrrrcuoN,
would  expect on the basis of  opportunity.
Misses  were not significantly  related  to serial
position of  the target, although inspection
showed that for  name targets misses were
twice as probable in the first two positions
as in the other positions,  and RTs  for cor-
rect detections were also longer. The  last
picture in  a sequence  was missed about as
frequently as were other pictures; however,
of  the  9  "misses,"  7  were  detection re-
sponses  with times longer than the 900-msec
cutoff. That  suggests  that the subject could
continue to process  the last picture, which
was not masked, beyond its actual time in
view.  In  the  recognition group,  as Potter
and Levy  (1969)  had found, the last pic-
ture was markedly easier  to remember  than
the others at all  rates (.69 vs. .27 uncor-
rected  ye-r  responses).
3  Unlike  detection  with  discontinuous  presenta-
tion,  in  a  continuous  presentation  there  may  be
uncertainty  whether  a  response was  made  to  the
target  or  to  some other  item.  In  general, that  un-
certainty  is an increasing function  of  the observed
false-alarm  (anticipation)  rate,  the  variance  of
the  RT  distribution,  the  width  of  the  temporal
windorv  for  accepting  a  response as  correct,  the
rate  of  presentation,  and  the  probability  that  a
subject will  fail  to  recognize and  report  an  antic-
ipation.  In  tlre  present  experiment,  those  factors
were  combined  to  arrive  at  an  estimate  of  the
probability  that  a  response  scored  as  a  correct
detection was  in  fact  a displaced false alarm  to  a
different  picture.  The  estimate  ranged  from  less
than .001 to  .016 at different  rates of  presentation;
the correction  would  not have altered the reoorted
results significantly. Note  that  when  such a  cor-
rection  is  used,  it  should  be  made  prior  to  a
standard  guessing correction  or  d'  calculation:  It
is not  a substitute for  them.
I The  formula  used to  correct  for  guessing u'as
Y. -  (7"y  -  Fy) / (1 -  FY),  where Iz"  = corrected
proportion  of  3:es responses, TJ/ =  proportion  o{
tr.res  to  old  pictures,  and  FY:  proportion  of
I'c.res  to  distractors.  Only  1'rses,  not  rnaybes,
were  included  because the  false-alarm  rate  for
f'es  (.05)  was  closer  to  the  estimated false-alarm
rate  in  detection  (less than  .02)  than  rvas that  of
1'as and nra"*be combined  (.20).  The  overall  pro-
portion  of  J'r.r responses to  old  pictures  was  .30,
and  3ras plts  m.aybe, .47.  Although  individual  d'
scores \4'ere not  used because many  subjects  had
no  false  alarms,  group  results  were  plotted  on
double probability  paper to  make  precise compari-
sons  (see  Footnote  6).  In  every  case, the  com-
parison  supported  the  reported  results.
Picture target
Anticipa-
tions  Misses
Name target
Anticipa-
tions  Misses
113
167
250
333
.19
.06
.02
.02
.31
.21
.06
.09
.05
.05
.05
.13
.09
.05
.02
.08
No!c.  Misses include  RTs  over  900 msec. Each  entry
based  on 256 obsrvations.
misses occurred at the higher rates of pre-
sentation,  whereas  anticipations were some-
what more evenly distributed across  rates.
The  difference between the  two  search
groups  was  primarily  in  the  number  of
misses, not  the  number  of  false positive
(anticipation)  responses. The  estimated
average probability  of  making  a  false de-
tection response  to a given nontarget picture
(the  false-alarm rate)  was  .0087 in  the
picture-target  group and .0112  in the name-
target group.3
Response time. RT  was measured from
the onset of the target picture. The overall
mean RT  for  correct  detections was 422
msec for  picture targets and 477 msec for
name  targets,  Mann-Whitney,  /  <  .001.
From the shortest  to the longest  presentation
time,  the  mean  RTs were  442,419,415,  and
417 lor  picture targets and 485, 470, 483,
and 472 for  name targets. Within  groups,
the only significant difference  in mean RTs
was between  the 125  and 250-msec  rates  for
picture  targets,  z = 2.09,  P < .05.  The result
was opposite to that expected if  there had
been  a speed-accuracy  tradeoff.
Recognition.  Figure I also  shows  the  pro-
portion of yes responses  to old pictures  in
the recognition  memory grotlp, corrected  for
guessing, for  the  same 128 pictures that
were used  as targets  in the search  groups.4
As  Potter and Levy  (1969) had reported,
recognition  scores  were higher the slower
the rate of presentation,  Friedman two-way
analvsis  of variance  by ranks,  I  < .001.
Serial  position.  In  the  search groups,
anticipation errors  were  more  likely  the
later  the  target  in  the  sequence,  as  oneCONCEPTUAL  I{EMORY FOR PICTURES 513
utsc'ttssl0n
As  in  the  earlier  search exDeriment
(Potter, 1975),  the  most  striking  result  was
the large difference  between  the probability
of correct  cletection  and later recognition.  In
tl'ris  experiment,  unlike  the  earlier  one,  a  small
but  significant clifference  between tl.re two
target groups was obtained  ; a picture rvas
nrore acctlrateiy detected when ;the subject
had seen  it  in advance  than when he had
onlv seen  its title. In the earlier  experiment
a ceiling effect  may have  obscured  the differ-
ence  betu'een  target  conclitions  ; performance
overall lvas some.what  lorver in the present
experiment, perhaps because  there was a
much larger sample  of targets  and they ap-
peared  in all serial  positions.
A  pictured  target  might  be  detected
solely  on the basis  of physical  features,  but
a named target clearly cannot be selected  in
that manner.  The features  common  to Dos-
siLle  pictures  of srrrall  boats  on a beach  ibut
different from those  of a couple  in the uwter
a.t  a bcach  and numerolls  other nontargets)
are primarily  semantic  or  conceptual,  not
physical. Because  he cannot determine  in
advance  just what physical  features  a named
target will  have, the viewer must iclentify
each  picture to see  if  it matches  the title's
meaning.  At  a rate of 113  msec  per picture,
64/a  of  the named targets were correctly
detected,  so presunrably  that percentage  of
nontarget pictures was also identified  mo-
mentarily.  In the  comparable  nonsearch  con-
dition only  ll/o  of the pictures could be
remembered  moments  later, which supports
the hypothesis  that pictures are identified
rapidly but then immediately forgotten un-
less  there is time for additional  processing.
RT  did not increase  as duration increased,
supporting the inference that  identification
usually occurred within the shortest  dura-
tion  used, 113 msec. The  interval after
identification  may  be considered  a  short-
term conceptual  memory.
Three other explanations  of  the results
must be considered,  however,  each  of which
would be  compatible  with the alternative  hy-
pothesis  that pictures enter long-term mem-
ory when they are identified, so there is no
short-ternr  conceptual  memory: (a) Expect-
ancy or set may har,e  selectively  facilitated
target identification.  (b)  A  recognition  test
nray be a less  sensitive  measure  of iclentifi-
cation tl'ran  a detection  proceclure.  (c)  In
tl.re  recognition  group, pictrrres  could have
been forgotten at any tinte in the interval
betrveen  presentation  and  recognition test
rather than immediately  r,vhen  the next pic-
ture appeared.  The first of these  possibili-
ties  rvill  be  corrsi,lererl  now,  an,1  tlre  second
and third in connection  u'ith Experiment 3.
\\'lren  a liewer expects  to see  sonrething,
his threshold  for that stimulus is lou'ered.
The lorver  thresholcl  or faster  RT  is thoueht
to  result from  selective  preactivalion  of
lrathr,r'ays  or  analyzers  used in  perceilirrg
or  responding to  that  stimulus. It  was
argued above that the physical feature an-
alvzers for  a  named target could not  be
primed because  they are not known. That
is, although pictures are iclentified  on the
basis  of physical  features,  the process  that
leads  from any  of a large  numl,ei  of ph-r  sical
arrays to the same  nreaning  would be cliffi-
cult to preactivate  simply by knowing the
end point, the meaning.  Although pacliella
(1975) found that giving the nanre  of a
pictured object in  ach'ance  of  a  brief  ex-
posure  did increase  recogr.rition  accuracv,  the
absolute  improvement  was very.nr"il.  In
contrast,  showing  the actual picture in ad-
vance had  a  large  positive effect, leacling
Pachella  to conclude  that "The information
neecled  to produce  a tneaningful [i.e., sub-
stantiall facilitation  of the extraction oro-
cesses  is highly specific  information ahout
the particular  stimulus  to be presented',  (p.
I  54).
ExpnnrlrrNr  2
The usual consequence  of expectancy  is a
decrease  in the  recognition  of or memory  for
nontargets  (e.g., Neisser  &  Beller, 1965;
Tulving &  Gold, 1963), at least when the
viewer is actively looking for the target (cf.
Posner  & Snyder, 1975).  Less depth  of proc-
essing  should  be needed  to reject a nontarget
when  the  target's  physical appearance is
known, than when only its name is known.
According to the expectancy  hypothesis,  thens14 MARY C. POTTER
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t'rcunn  2. Experiment  2:  Proportion  of  targets
detected and  nontarget  pictures  recognized  at  dif-
ferent  rates of  presentation. (Recognition  perform-
ance of  a  matched  subgroup  from  Experiment  I
is also shown.)
target search  should  have  an adverse  effect  on
rrontarget  retention,  and the negative  effect
shorrld  be greater  for pictured targets.  The
fate of nontargets  *'as examined  in Experi-
ment 2. Apart from the specific  prediction  of
the  expectancy  hypothesis,  Experiment  2
addresses  the question  of rvhether  pictures
are encoded  and stored automatically,  re-
gardless  of attention.  If  encoding  does  not
require  central  capacity,  then neither  search
task should interfere rvith  retention of  the
nontarget  pictures.
M etlrod
Subiects.  Eight  college  students  'r"'ere assigned
to each of two  groups.
Procedure.  The  materials,  apparatus, and  proce-
dure  r'r.ere  like  those of  the  trvo  search groups  in
Experiment  1, except that  each subject saw only  8
sequences and  each  sequence was  followed  by  a
recognition  test of  the  l6  pictures intermixed  with
16 distractors.  The  recognition  procedure was  like
that  of  the  recognition  group  in  Experiment  l.
Four  rates  of  presentation  and  16 serial  positions
of  the  target  $'ere  permuted  within  and  across
subj  ects.
Subjects were  instructed  that  their  primary  task
was  to  respond to  the target  picture  as accurately
and  rapidly  as possible;  the  recognition  task  was
secondary.
Resttlts  and Discussion
Torget deteclion.  The proportion of cor-
rect detections  in  the two groups is shown
in Figure 2  (upper curves), which may be
compared  with  Figure 1. The difference  be-
tween the two target groups in Experiment
2 was not significant  (each  point was based
on only 16 trials), but the general  results
lvere in accord with those of Experiment 1.
The  overall proportion correct was .84 for
the  picture-target group  and  .72  {or  the
name-target group, compared with  .87 and
.76  in Experiment 1.
The mean RT  for  correct detections  'was
495  msec  in the picture  group and 538  msec
in  the  name group,  Nlann-Whitney,  p (
.02. The  RTs  in  the picture-target  group
&'ere longer than those for  the contparable
subgroup  of subjects  in Experiment 1, sign
test,  p (  .01.  RTs in the name-target  group
were aiso longer, but the difference  !\'as not
significant.
I{ontarget  recognition. Target  search re-
duced  memory  for nontarget  pictures,  so the
€ncoding  and storage  of pictures  is not au-
tomatic.  Contrary  to  the  expectancy hy-
pothesis,  looking for a pictured target cost
nontargets  no more than did looking for a
namecl  target. The  corrected 1'es  responses
for the trvo groups  are shown in Figure 2.
(The overall  uncorrected  proportion  of true
J'e.r responses  was  .20 and  {alse 1'es re-
sponses,  .03  ; the proportion  of true maybes
rvas  .18  and  false  mnybes,.14.)  Also shown
are the recognition  responses  for a subgroup
of eight subjects  in Experiment 1 who saw
the same  sequences  with the same  order of
rates  and  had  the same  recognition  tests,  but
did not search  for a target. Each point is
based  on 2,10  responses  in each  of the search
groups  and  256  responses  in the Experiment
1  subgroup. The  target picture  itself was
on-ritted  from  the recognition curves of the
trvo search  groups. (Not  surprisingly,  the
target  picture was always remembered by
the picture-target  group.  In the name-target
group the target picture was always recog-
nized later if  it  had been detected  and was
recognized  on 6 of the 11 times  it had been
missed.) Overall,  nontarget recognition in
the search groups was lower than recogni-CONCEPTUAL  I,{ET{ORY FOR PICTURES
tion  irr  the  Expcrinrerrt  I srr[rgroup,  sign  test
or-r  the chance-correctecl  scores  of  matched
pairs  of sr.rbjects,  I  < .01.  There u,as  no sig-
nificant difference  betu,een  the trvo search
grorlps.
'1-o deterr.nine  rvhether ir.rterference  u,ith
nontarget processing  occtirrerl  both before
arrd  after tlre larget picture rvas  rletccted,
those  serluences  in rvhich  the target  \\'as  cor-
rectlv cletected  were exarrined.  The last pic-
ture in each secluerrce,  rvhich is invariably
easv to  rer-nember,  i,l'as omitted  f  rom  the
anall'sis.  There u'as no  significant  overall
difference  in the probability of recognizing
n rrorrtrrret  rictrrre  lreiore  t'crsus  aiter the
target  rn,as  detectecl.  In  the  name-target
grorlp, hon  ever, the  picture  immediately
after the targc't  u'as significantly  less  often
1sq,'grrizerl  than lrter  posttarget  pictrlres,
x'(1)  :  1.11  , p (  .05.  Thus,  the  occurrence
ancl  cletection  of a target had no retrograde
effect  and only a minimal anterograde  effect
on acljacent  pictures  (cf. Erdelyi & Blumen-
thal,1973).
The results  support the prediction  of the
expectancy hvpothesis that  target  search
r,l'ould  inter{ere r,l'ith  nontarget processing.
Contrarv to  that hypothesis,  however, the
interferelrce  rvas no  greater for  pictured
than  for lrallred  targets  and  no greater  beiore
than after the target r,vas  iderrtified.  Clearly,
u''hen  searching  for a pictured  target  subjects
did not attend exclusir,ely  to physical  fea-
tures. Since the adverse  effect of having a
target in n.rind  was similar for both groups,
the interference  is likely to have  occurred  at
a level of processing  common  to both, pre-
sumably the conceptual  level. The  search
task  may  have  interfered  with  nontarget
memory either by making nontargets  more
difficult to identify (as the expectancy  hy-
pothesis rvould suppose) or  by  reducing
postidentification  processing  required  for re-
tention.  In  summary,  the  expectancy hy-
pothesis  was only partially supported.
Expp,nrntBnr  3
Experiment 3 directly tested  the opposing
claim of the short-term conceptual  nremory
hypothesis, the  claim  that  even an  unex-
pected  picture can be identified with a brief
presentation.  Pictures were presented  singly
for a brief cluration  in a tachistoscope,  pre-
ceclcd  and follou,ed  by a visual r.nask,  and
recognition nrerrory  $'as  measurecl  after
each  block  of 16  pictures,  just as in Experi-
ments  1 and  2. It tvas  assunted  that the  lnask
u'oulcl block frrrther visual processing  so
that the picture ivould not be rententbered
tunless  it  had been identified before tnask
onset.  (That assur.nption  is examined  ir.r  the
general  discussion.)
Although a noisy  nask may block  further
zisrrol processing,  presumably  it  does not
block higher level processing.  That  is, ur.r-
like  an  inrmecliately  follolving picture, a
nreaningless  nrask  lnay not interfere r,r,'ith  the
h1'pothesizecl  posticlentification  processing  re-
quired for retention.  In  that case  it  rrould
be possible  to remember  a brieflv exposed
picture  providecl  that it rvas  identified  before
mask onset. (Identification appears  to  be
necessarv  for retention,  in the present  task.
In a separate  experiment,  it lvas  four.rd  that
tunless  a subject  could  give  a correct  descrip-
tion of some  part of the picture  immediately
after a tachistoscopic  exposure  of a given
cluration,  he lvas  unlikely to recogr.rize  it on
a later test.)
The prediction  of the short-term  coltcep-
tual memory hypothesis  was that recogni-
tion memory for  single pictures rvould be
equal to detection  of sequential  pictures  at
sin.rilar  exposure  durations  and superior to
nrernory  {or sequential  pictures  at those  du-
rations.
Method
Strbiects. The  subjects were  8 men  and  l{omen
college  students, run  individually,  who  were  paid
for  their  participation.
lt[aterials.  One  hundred  forty-four  10 x  15-cm
color  photographs,  the  originals  of  those used by
Potter and Levy  (1969) and Potter  (1975), were
shorvn tachistoscopically.  (The  pictures  were  half
of  the  population  of  pictures used in  Experiments
7 and 2.)  Colored  5 x  5-cm  slides of  the  pictures,
mixed  with  an equal number  of  new pictures, were
used in  the  recognition  test.
The  mask  was  a  collage  of  scraps  of  colored
paper,  cut  into  circles  and  irregular  shapes from
.5 to  1.5 cm  in  size and  scattered densely over  a
surface larger  than the photographs. A  black  cross
marked  the fixation  point.
Apparatus.  A  Gerbrands  two-channel  tachisto-
scope, Model  T-28-1,  was  used to  present the pic-
tures.  The  average  luminance  for  both  mask  and
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pictures  was  approximately  1.8 f.tL  (6.2  cdlm,).
The slides for  the recognition test lvere shown using
a  Carousel  projector  on  a screen 2.75 m  from  the
subject. In  the tachistoscope and on  the screen the
pictures  were  approximately  l5'  wide  and  10.
high.
Procedure.  Pictures  rvere  shown  once  each  in
the  tachistoscope.  The  mask  was  visible  except
when  a picture  was on. The  subject was  instructed
to fixate  the cross on the mask, and 300 msec after
the  experimenter  said  "ready"  a  picture  appeared.
There  was  an  interval  of  approximately  4.5  sec
between  pictures.  After  each block  of  16 oictures
(corresponding  to  one  sequence in  Experiments
I  and 2)  a recognition  test was given  in  which  the
16 old  pictures  rvere mixed  with  16 new  pictures,
and the subject said yes if  he had seen the picture
in  the  tachistoscope, maybe, or  no  if  he  had  not.
The procedure was the same as that in Experiments
1 and,2.
The  first  block  of  pictures,  shown  at  90-msec
duration,  rvas  considered  practice  and  was  not
scored. Four  exposure durations, 50, 70, 90, and
120  msec,  were  used  in  the  eight  experimental
blocks  (the  exposure  durations  were  selected on
the basis  of pilot results). As in Experirnents 1 and
2, duration  was  constant rvithin  a block  of  16 oic-
tures, and  the  order  of  durations  rvas permutcd
across subjects so that each blork  of  pictures rias
slrou'n equally often at eaclr duration.
Results
The overail  proportion of yrs  attd  nnybe
responses  to old and nerv  pictures,  after each
exposure  duration,  is shorvn  in Table 2. As
expected,  the longer  the exposure  the higher
the probability of  correctly recognizing  a
picture  subsequently,  Friedman  two-in,ay
anah'sis  of variance  by ranks,  p < .001.
In  Potter  and  Levy's  E,xperiment I
(1969) the sarne  blocks  of 16 pictures  u,ere
shou-n  in  an uninterrupted sequence  (i.e.,
u'ithout the 4.5-sec  mask between  oictures)
at duraticrns  lrer picture  of  125,  iOZ, ZSO,
and 333 msec  for one group and 250, 500,
1,000,  and 2,000 msec for  another group.
TABLE 2
Proponrlou  or  Connacr  lNn  Far_sE RrcocNrrrox
RospoNses, ExpnntrrreNt 3
oLO
z
li o.e
o
z
d  oo
-  RECOGN  T ON TXP,  ]
---StcoGNrrloN
POTTER  8 LTVY
5C  /C  90  t2O
EXPOS  URE
167  250  333  500  t00c  20C￿a
OURATION  N MSEC  LOG  SCALE
Nore.  Each point is basd  on 256 observations.
_ Frcune  3.  Proportion  of  pictures  recognized  in
Experiment  3  (single  masked  presentations)  and
Potter  and Levy's  (1969)  Experiment  1  (continu_
ous sequential  presentation).
E,ach  sequence  was  followecl  by a recognition
test,  as in both the present  experimeirt  and
the recognition  grotrps  of  _Experiments  1
and  2. The proportions  of true 1,es  resDonses
for  Potter and Levy's experiment  "rrd th.
present experiment,  corrected  for  guessing
(see Footnote  4),  are shon,n  in Figure 3I
(  The last pictrrre  in  each  contirruJus  se-
quence,  rvhich  had a high probability  of rec-
ognition  because  it was not followed  bv an-
other picture,  n.as  onritted.  For exampie.  at
the 125-nrsec  rate,  performance  on the last
pictnre fell betn'een  that of  the 70 and 90_
rlsec durations  in the present  experinrent.)
Discussion
In agreement  with the hypothesis  that an
average picture is  identified rapidlv  and
thereafter  is remembered  despite  a  subse-
<1uent  lisual mask (it  the mask cloes  not
demand  higher level  processing),  over B0/o
of the pictures were rememberecl  after an
exposure of  120 msec, a level of  Derform_
ance consistent  with  the tachistoscopic  lit-
erature.  In contrast,  when the ar,.,-ra  piatu.a,
were presented  in  a  continuou, ,iqu..,..
in _  Potter and Levy's experiment (i969)
only  11/o  were remembered  alter a  725-
msec  exposure,  just as only 11/o were re_
membered  after a 113-msec  exposure  in Ex_
periment  1.  The results  shown  in Figure 3
suggest  that a picture continues  to b-e  sub-
ject  to  conceptual masking by  a  following
picture for at least 1 sec.b
-5  Was  the  noisy mask in  Experiment 3  less
effective  as  a visual  mask  than  a following picture  ?
Duration
Old pictures
Mal  be
New pictures
V*  la.tfr" \-es
.07
.05
.04
.03
50
70
90
t20
..50  .15
.68  .1  1
.79  .08
.83  .05
.18
.12
.13
.09A  conrparison  betrveen  Figures 1 and 3
shou's that  at  comparable  exposure  dura-
tions recogr-rition  menrorit  in Experirnent  3
u'as, if  an1'thing,  better than detection  in
Experinrer-rt  1.0  Clearly,  it  is not necessary
to knou.  in advance  u'hat one is looking  for
to  iclentify  a picture presented  for as little
as 120 msec.  The expectancy  h1'pothesis  is
therefore  not neecled  to explain  detection  ir.r
E,xperiments  1 ancl  2. Nor carr  the disparity
betu'een  detection  and recognition  menrory
obtained  in Experirnent  I be attributed  to an
intrinsic difference in  sensitivitv betn'een
irunrediate  delectiolr  and  clelei  ecl  recogriition.
According to the present  h1'pothesis  the
critical  exposure drrrations in  sequential
search  and isolatecl  n.rasked  oresentation  are
sirrrilar  because  the rrecessary  and sufficierrt
conclition  for a correct  response  in each  case
is iclentification  of the  picture  before  the  next
visual event. Ir-r  search,  successful  identifi-
cation initiates  an irrer,ocable  matching  and
respollse  process  that is not affected  by the
conceptual  content of the next picture. In
the conditions  of Experiment 3, successfrrl
identification  perrnits  continued  higher ler.el
processing  (consolidation),  processing  that
is itnmune  to strictly visual  masking.
GrNEn,rr  DlscussroN
The present  results  and their theoretical
implications may  be  recapituiated  briefly.
The initial observations  reported  bv Potter
( 1975\  and replicated  in Experinr.ni I *.r.
the fnlloiting:  Tn searching  for a particular
picture in a rapid sequence  of 16 pictures,
vielvers accurately picked out  the  target
more than 60/o of the time,  at a rate of 113
msec  per pictnre,  even  when the target pic-
ture had only been  described  by a brief title.
In  contrast,  when the task was simply to
look at the sequence  presented  at 113  msec
That  question  is  in  principle  difficult  to  answer
because the  hypothesis under  consideration  claims
that  a picture  produces higher  level interference  in
addition  to  visual  masking.  Informal  observations
suggested that  the  noisy  mask  was  as  effective
as  a  typical  picture  in  blocking  perception,  when
the  picture  used as a  mask  was  familiar  and  the
viewer  tried  to  ignore  it.  (Whether  an  observer
can  voluntarily  disattend  a  new  picture  is  doubt-
ful.  )
6  To  make  a  precise  comparison  betrveen  de-
tection  and  retention,  two  criteria  must  be  rnet:
(a)  Nontargets  and  distractors  as well  as tarsets
and "old"  pictures must be equivalent in  tlre tu.o
procedures;  and  (b)  the  measure of  performance
must  be the same. In  the present experiments,  tl.re
first  criterion  was met  because targets,  pictures  to
be recognized, nontargets,  and distractors  were  all
selected randomly  from  the  same set of  pictures.
( The  named targets  u ere  deliberately impover-
ished.) The  second  criterion  was met by calculating
group  hit  (H)  and false alarm  (Fo)  probabilities
for  both detection and recognition, and plotting  the
result on double probability  paper (the conventional
conversion  to  d'  was  not  made  because sloDes  are
typically  less than  1.0).  For  the  ycs-niybe-no
recognition  test, the  procedure  is  straightfoirvard.
For  _detection,  H=(D-K)/(N-A),  and,  Fa -  (A  +  K) /CN,  where  D  =  number 
'of 
correct
detections, K  =  estimated number  of  responses ac-
cepted  as  correct  detections  that  weri  actuallv
Fos  (see  Footnote  3;  this  number  was  small  in
the  present experiments),  .|y'=overall  number  of
trials,  A  =  number  of  trials  on  which  an  antic-
ipatory  response occurred, and C =  the mean num-
ber  of  pretarget  pictures  (7.5  in  these  exoeri_
ments).
.  Plotted  on  double  probability  paper, the  results
indicate  that  detection of  a  pictuied  target  at  lL3
msec  per  picture  is  stightly  less  accurate  than
recognition  memory  in  Experiment  3 after  a  120_
msec exposure. Detection of  a named target  at  ll3
msec falls  between the  70 and  90-msec J*po.o..r.
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per picture,  the  vierver  u'as  found to remem-
ber onl1,  about 1l/o  of.  the pictures.  (N,Iem-
ory was  rneasured  by a recognition  test  given
inmediately after the sequence.)  X,{ernory
in.rprovecl  markedly  with more time per pic-
ture. At  the slorvest  rate used in  E,xperi-
nrent 1. 33J nrsec  per picture, 4)/a  u-ere
rer.nernbered  ;  in  an  earlier experiment of
Potter  arrd Levy  (1969)  about 62/o  were
renrernbered  at a rate of 500 msec  and over
90/a at 2 sec  per pictr-rre.  Thus, detection  of
a specified  picture ir.r  a sequence  is ren.rark-
abll' easl' at rates of presentation  so high
that very ferv of the pictures  are likely to
be renrernbered,  even  though the same  pic-
tnres  are easily  renrembered  lvhen  presented
more slou'ly.
Trvo cornpeting  hr,potheses  that might ac-
corrnt  for the gap betu'een  the critical du-
ration for detection  and retention  l\'ere  colt-
siclered.  According to hypothesis  I  identifi-
cation  of a pictrrre  ordinarily occurs  rvithin
113 n.rsec,  thus pern.ritting  detection  in the518  I\'{ARY  C.
search  task.  After initial identification.  horv-
ever,  several  hundred  milliseconds  of further
processing  are required  before  the rnen.rory
trace becomes  immune to interference  from
subsequent  pictures.  The stage  of processing
after identification  but prior to consolidation
may be cor.rsidered  to be a short-terrn  con-
ceptual  memory.
According  to hypothesis  2, hou'ever,  there
is no short-term  conceptual  memory: Once
a  picture has been identified,  it  is  stably
represented  in long-term  nenlory. Hypothe-
sis 2 rnight account  for the detection-reten-
tion disparity  by one or more of the follorv-
ing  subordinate h1'potheses:  (a)  In  the
search task, expectallcy may  have recluced
the time reclrrirecl  to iclentifv  the target pic-
ture.  (b  )  Sr,rbjects  nray have adopted a
lou.er response  criterion for  detection  than
for  recognition.  (c)  Even if  pictrrres  were
forgotter.r  bet'ween  preser.rtation  and recogr.ri-
tion test, forgetting may not have occurred
in the first ferv  hundrecl  rnilliseconds  as h1'-
pothesis  1 asserts.  Picture memory  may last
longer than claintecl,  but  characteristics  o{
the recognition  procedure,  such  as the many
pictures  in the nteuory set  and the presence
of clistractors,  may prodr.rce  interference.
Evidence rvas presented  against each of
the subordir.rate  h1'potheses  of hl.pothesis  z.
Concerning hvpothesis  2a, expectancy  ap-
pears  to have  only a small  effect  on identifi-
cation  tinre.  The scanty  semantic  information
about  the target given by a verbal  title was
almost as usefrrl  in the search  task as the
complete  senrantic  and physical  information
given by  shorving the picture in  advance
(  Potter, 197  5, and Iixperiment  1  ) , whereas
the  effect  of  e,xpectancy  on  identification
threshold  is knorn".n  to be highly sensitive  to
the specificity  of advance  in{ormation (Pa-
chella,  1975). In Experiment  2 the  negative
effect  of a pictured  target  on nontarget  mem-
ory was no greater than that of a named
target,  contrary to the expectancy  hvpothe-
sis. The  overall negative effect of  target
search  on  nontarget memory is consistent
with hypothesis  2a but could  be equally  well
explained  by hypothesis  1 on the assumption
that  the  search task  interfered with  post-
identification processing.  Finally, in Experi-
POTTER
ment 3, unexpected  pictures  lvere  easily  re-
r.nernbered  when presentecl  for  120 msec.
The pictures  were  preceded  and follorved  by
a visual  mask,  so it is likely that thel' rvere
identified  during exposure.
Concerning hypothesis  2b, the criterion
for responding  in the search  task  was  higher
than in the recognition  task, so the gap be-
trveen  detection  and recognition  is not at-
tributable to a criterion difference.  As  for
hypothesis  2c, the high  recognition  scores
obtained  in  lixperir.nent  3  sholv that con-
cornitants  of the recognition  proceclure  such
:ts  the  interval  betrveen  presentation  ar.rd  test,
the nranl' pictures  in ntemory,  and the po-
tential  interference  {rorn  interver.ring  pictures
ancl distractors,  clo not ir.r  themselves  Dro-
rlrrce  forgettirrg  of brie111'  preserrted  pictrires.
Similarly, at the longer clurations  usecl  by
Potter and I.evy  (1969), recogr.rition  per-
fonnance  reached  a high level.
The present  finclings  thus support  the hy-
pothesis  that a picture  or scelte  is iclentified
rapiclly,  u,hether  or not it is expectecl.  Once
it  has been identified  it  can be conrpared
immecliatelv  rvith  a  target description in
nrenrory.  For  a period of several  hundred
nrilliseconcls  after initial iclentification,  horv-
ever, the nremorv  trace is subject  to inter-
ference  from conceptual  processing  such as
that requirecl  to iclentify  a follorving  picture.T
I  have called  that interference  conceftual
nt,ashing  to rlistinguish  it fronr r.isrral  ruask-
ing, which interferes  u'ith the visr,ral  pro-
cessing  that precedes  iclentification.  (The re-
lated tenl  cognitiz,e  tttaslting,  rrsed  b1'  Wa1-
lev and \\'eiclen, 1973, and others, is not
restricted to  a  postidentification  stage of
processing.)  A rneaningless  visual  nrask  that
does  not invoke  higher level  processing  can
interfere  lvith preidentification  but not rvith
7  Forward  masking  does not  appear to  be a sig-
nificant  factor  in  the  present  experiments.  The
first  picture  in  a  sequence, even  though  free  of
forward  masking,  r,as  if  anything  worse  than
those in  other  positions both  in  Experiment  1 and
in  Potter  and  Levy's  recognition  memory  ex-
periments  (1969).  The  last  picture  in  a  sequence,
which  is  subject  to  forward  but  not  backward
masking,  was  much  easier to  remember  than  the
other pictures in both experiments.postidentilication processing (Experirnent
Potter  and  Levy  (1969)  clairned that
"anah'sis  and storage  of a picture continue
onlr.  until the  next substar.rtial  visual  change"
(p.  1a). The present  results  qualiiy that
conclrlsion:  Once sor.ne  element  of a picture
has been identified,  a change  in the visual
array  rvill  not  stop conceptual  processing
unless  the ne\\'  arrav itself elicits  such  pro-
cessing.  \\reaver (1974) and Tversky and
Sherrlan (1975) report that increasing  the
duration  of a blank  interval  between  oictures
inrproves recognilion nremory, although
Shaffer and Shiffrin  (1972\  had obtained
rro difference  among intervals  of 1,2,  or 4
sec. Lutz  and Scheirer (1974\  varied the
durations  of nrasked  intervals  between  pho-
tographs of  single objects and found that
lorrger  intervals  lvere  associated  with better
recognition  memorv. In all the experinrents
longer  stimulus  on-times  also  improved  per-
formance. Differences among the  experi-
mellts may be explained  by  differences  in
rhe  sirnilarity  of distractors  and old pictures.
When  distractors  are chosen  to be highly
confusable  rvith old pictures,  more process-
ing tinre (on time or off time) is needed  to
reach aslmptote for  that test. The results
are consistent  with  the h1'pothesis  that the
mair.r  therne  of a picture  is identified  rapidly,
although  further  tirne  may  be  needed to
identify and retain details that would dis-
tinguish  it  frorn  thematically or  visually
sin-rilar  pictures.
Time to see,  detect,  or store a ficture. The
probabilities of  detection and  retention
shou.n in Figures I  and 3 can be regarded
as  curnulative probability distributions of
the threshold  stimulus  duration  {or a correct
response  (if  one disregards  the few non-
monotonic  points). The distributions  sample
both pictures and subjects.  Using  Spear-
man's distributior.r  method (Woodin'orth  &
Schlosberg,  1954)  and  adjusting  for the  par-
ticular  temporal  intervals  in each  experiment,
one can convert the cur.nulative  distribution
into a stepped  probability distribution.  The
resulting curve shows the  estimated  pro-
portion of responses  whose  duration  thresh-
old  fell  in  a  given  tempordl  interval.
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Frcunr  o. ".'-i:u  ;:,:;:,",.  or duration
thresholds:  Recognition  memory  after  single
tachistoscopic  presentations  (Experiment  3) ;  de-
tection rvith two  kinds of  targets  (Experiment  l)  ;
and recognition  after  continuous  sequential presen-
tation  (Experiment  1 and  Potter  and  Levy's  Ex-
periment  1B).  (The  three  left-hand curves  may
reflect  identification  threshold  and  the  remaining
curve  consolidation  in  memory.)
For  example,  at a rate of 167 msec,  89/o
of pictured targets in  Experirnent 1 were
detected,  and at  250 msec, 96/o  were  de-
tected. One can infer  that  in  the 83 msec
betrueen  167 and 250 msec about 7/o  ol the
pictures  reached  threshold  for detection,  or
about 1% p"t  l0-msec  interval in that part
of the distribution. The preser-rt  data for de-
tection  and tachistoscopic  recognition  cover
only the upper part of the curve, but by
making the assurnption  (based  on tachisto-
scopic  performance)  that the lower bounds
fall between  25 and 50 msec  and by smooth-
ing  the  steps one can  draw  approximate
distributions.
Such  distributions  for Experiments  1 and
3 are shown in Figure 4. Anticipatory er-
rors in detection  were treated  as false  alarms
(see Footnote  6).  Corrected  yes responses
(omitting the last picture in  a  sequence)
were used in  the recognition  curves, and
Potter and Levy's results  for longer dura-
tions were combined with  those of Experi-
m€nt I  to obtain the sequential  recognition
curve.  The step  distributions  were smoothed
by  eye. The  curves, although approximate,
make clear the marked difference in  time
course  between  the two processes  that have
been hypothesized: initial  identification and
subsequent  consolidation.  The median dura-
9
G
F
@
z
o
a
!
6
6
o
'. ''.--- ....--TACHISToSCoptC  RECOGNTTION
_--__-NAN1E  TARGET
--.-. -..-.SEOUENTIAL  RECOGN]TION.520  MARY C-
tion for  iclentification  is 100 msec or less,
rvhereas  that for  retention approaches  400
tnsec.  The latter  estirnate  is for consolidation
tin.re  rvhen the  picture remains in  view;
rvhen  it is replaced  by a mask shortly after
iclentification,  subsecluent  processing tirne
nay neecl  to be  longer  to reach  an equivalent
rnernory  strength.  Although these  estimated
tinres  are particular  to the stimuli and pro-
cerlures  of the present  experin'rents,  the rela-
tive times for  the trvo processes  ntay be
n'rore  general.
SItort-ternr.  conce  f tual 'menrorJ'.  The inter-
val iretween  iclentification  ar.rd  consolidation
constitutes  a very brief conceptual  merlory.
Tt is not the same  as iconic memorv, since
it  survives  visrral  me.kirrg  anrl is a post-
identification  rather than a preiclentification
stage. Phillips  (  197a) tested rnernory  for
nonsense  arra)'s  to denronstrate  the  existence
oI a lirritecl-capacity  posticonic  visual store
lasting at  least 600 nrsec,  a  store that  is
relativel,v  imnrune  to visual masking.  Could
srtch  a short-term  visual memorv have  oer-
rrritterl  identification  of a pictrrie  oltcr the
nrasli  nl,pearcd  irr Experirrrent  3  ? For  a
corrplex  picture,  it  seems rrnlikely that
enorrgh  purelv  visual  1i.e..  rrnirlentified)  ele-
ments  could be retained  to pernrit  postrnask
iclentification. Rather,  short-tern.r visual
nremory  for a nonsense  array mav itself  re-
cluire  sonre  fornr of premasl<  analvsis  of fea-
tures,  a level  of processing  that rvould  result
in irleritificntion  if the array \\'ere  nrcarring-
ful. (In  neither case  does  identification  in-
ply  nanring:  cf. Footnote  1.) In the  preserrt
search  task it is unlikelv that pictures  were
irlentified  after the nr"r-k  ^pp."red,  because
the mask u'as  itself  a picture  that needed  to
be identifiecl.  Potter and Levy  (1969) pro-
vide additional evidence  that pictures in a
sequence  are processed  only until the next
picture appears.
Unlike  verbal  short-term memory, the
present  short-terrn  memory for pictures  can
apparently  hold and process  only one scene
and has  a time course  of tenths  of a second
rather  than 2 or more seconds.  One question
that arises  is r,r'hether  there  is an equivalent
short-ternr conceptual  memory foi  verbal
material,  distinct from the standard  acous-
tic-articulatory buffer. Forster ( 1970) found
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that  u'ith  rapid  serial visual presentation
(RSVP)  inrmediate  recall  of a short string
of u,orcls  u'as  sensitive  to both semantic  ancl
syntactic  variables,  even  at the high rate of
62 msec  a rvord.  Since  the number  of rvords
clid not exceed  the memory span,  the sub-
ject's inability to remember  as nrany  rvords
from  scran'rbled  as from ordered sentences
srrggests  that  the  'rvords tvere unclerstood
momentarily during  presentation (or  the
ordered sentences  could rrot hat  e been re-
called)  but were  often  immediately  forgotten
as each  subserluent  lvord failed  to fit in rvith
the sense  of  the preceding  ones. Forster
(1975) argued that there is a verv short-
teml  mentory for  identified  rvorcls  distinct
fronr the rrsual  short-term  nremorv.  At  the
high rates  of presentatiorr  usecl  in Forster's
experinrents  there may be too little tinre to
reaci  each  rvorcl  into a phonological  buffer,
ancl  so an identified  worcl  may be subject  to
tl're  sarne  conceptual  rnasking  from irrelevant
subsequent  u,orcls  that  has been hr.pothe-
sized  for pictures.
In  cornnron  u'ith  either forrn of  verbal
short-term  ntentory,  the short-ternl  concep-
tuirl nremory  for scenes  may provicle  a brief
rvorking span  during rvhicl'r  various control
I)rocesses  can be initiated,  one of u.hich is
conrparing  the identifiecl  picture n ith a tar-
get in mernory.  In  normal vision, another
inrlrortant control  process concerus the
choice  of the next point of fixation. Sinrple
e_ve  mo\-elnent  ItT  is about 200 nrsec.  ivhich
includes  the time to process  the location  of
a light cue (Saslow,  1967).  If it takes  100
msec  to nnderstand  something  about a fix-
ated region, in  line u'ith the present  esti-
mate for pictures,  then an average  fixation
of aborrt  300  msec  rvould  give  time to choose
the locus of the next fixation on the basis
of ir.rformation  obtained  during the current
fixation (e.g., Rayner, 1975). If  rve could
not identify rvhat rve are looking at before
initiating the next fi-xation,  we lvoulcl  pre-
srrnrably  make many more regressions  and
double  takes  than we do.
trIost of  the time, perception  is neither
as  directed  as  in a search  task  nor as  neutral
as in a retention  task.  Rather,  one  is folding
each new percept into an ongoing spatial
and conceptual  schema  developed  from long-ternr  mernory and  irnrnediate  past experi-
ences.  A  major  function of the postidentifi-
cation phase  of a fixation might be to allow
the appropriate  assimilation  of  new infor-
nration  to the schenra  so that the particular
glimpse can be safely forgotten as an inde-
pendent unit  of  inforrnation. Our  lack  of
awareness  of the succession  of snapshots  of
which visual  stimulation  is composed  attests
to the  effectiveness  of this folding-in  process.
Conclusion.  The results  of the present  ex-
periments  support  the hypothesis  that a pre-
liminary  identification of  a cornplex mean-
ingful scene  occurs  within about 100 rnsec,
u'hether  or not the scene  is expected.  Rapid
identification  of a pictrrre  permits  target de-
tection but  does lrot guarantee  retention;
about  300  msec  of further processing  may be
required, on the average,  to fix  a picture in
the  stable long-tenn lnemory characteristic
of pictures.  A  picture is subject to visual
masking only rrp to the point of identifica-
tion, but the mernory  trace continues  to be
vuhrerable  to conceptual  masking until the
a<lditional  processing  necessary  for retention
is  cornplete.  It  rernains  to  be determined
whetl.rer  sin.rultaneous  processing  in another
moclality lvould act as a conceptual  mask  ;
recent  rvork revieu'ed  by Rorve  and Rogers
(1975) suggests  that it might. Such inter-
ference  rvould be expected  if  a single  con-
ceptuai s)'stem  ur.rderlies  both pictorial and
linguistic  unclerstanding  and merl.rory  (Pot-
ter & Faulconer,  1975).
It appears  that when visual  arrays  change
at a high rate, as for example  with succes-
sive eve fixations,  much more is seen  and
understood  than is retained.  This  momen-
tary conceptual  memory perrnits  the vierver
to respond  to relevant  evellts  (targets) even
lvhen visual events are changing too fast
for him to ret.nember  much. The normal rate
of eye fixations, three a second,  represents  a
reasonable  compromise  betlveen  the need  for
rapid  monitoring of  the  environment for
significant  events  and the need  to remernber
some  portion of r,l'hat  otle  has seen.
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